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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a : 
Utah corporation 
Plaintiff-Appellee, Case No. 900299-CA 
vs. 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah Oral Argument Priority 
corporation, : No. 16 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction upon the Utah Court of Appeals is 
pursuant to an Order of the Supreme Court of the State of 
Utah. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
IN TRIAL COURT 
This is a civil action arising out of a breach of a 
Lease Cancellation Agreement between plaintiff-Appellee, 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah Partnership, (hereinafter generally 
referred to as "Hermes"), and defendant-Appellant, PARK'S 
SPORTSMAN, a Utah Corporation (hereinafter generally referred 
to as "Park's"). 
The trial court, the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
presiding, after a bench trial, entered its findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and awarded judgment in favor of Hermes 
and against Park's. 
Park's Sportsman appeals from and seeks reversal of 
that final judgment of the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review to the 
Court of Appeals. 
1. Did the execution and delivery of the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement constitute novation of the Hermes-
Park's Lease ? 
2. Did plaintiff breach the implied covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, in its dealings with defendant ? 
3. Did Park's Sportsman become a surety for the 
obligations of Gart Bros ? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is a civil case which involves the review of 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the trial 
court, based upon the trial in this matter, in order to 
determine whether or not there are sufficient evidence in the 
record to sustain the findings of the trial Court. 
The issues in this case relate to the legal meaning 
of the Lease Cancellation Agreement. 
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B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
After the filing of the complaint and the 
appropriate responsive pleadings by defendant, the parties 
engaged in discovery. At the conclusion of the discovery 
phase of the litigation, a trial was had before the Honorable 
Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge presiding, without a jury. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, defendant 
offered no witness and no other evidence on the merits of the 
case, except a proffer (through defendant's counsel) of proof 
relating to attorney's fees and certain exhibits related 
thereto. 
After argument by both counsel the Court made and 
entered its findings in open court. 
Thereafter written findings of facts and conclusions 
of law were submitted to the Court; after a hearing and 
disposition of defendant's objections, final findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and a judgment thereupon was signed by 
the trial Court on February 28, 1990. 
Notice of the Judgment so entered was given to 
defendant on February 28, 1990. 
It is from the final Judgment entered on February 
28, 1990, that defendant appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiff, Hermes Associates, is a Utah 
Partnership, owner and operator of a shopping center project 
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known as the Family Center at Midvalley, located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah; (Tr. p. 16). 
2. Defendant, Park's Sportsman, Inc., is a Utah 
corporation, which by and through Russell Park and Randy Park, 
negotiated a lease with plaintiff, and became plaintiff's 
Tenant at the Family Center at Midvalley; (Tr. p. 17, Exhibit 
6) 
3. On or about May 20, 1982, Hermes as Landlord, 
and Park's as Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the 
"Park's Lease") for 13,500 square feet of retail commercial 
space located at Hermes' shopping center, known as the 
Midvalley Family Center, at 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake 
County, Utah; (Tr. 17, lines 13-16; Exhibit 6). 
4. Defendant Park's entered into possession of the 
leased premises and operated its retail sporting goods store 
until sometime in April 2nd or 7th of 1987. 
5. Defendant Park's, by and through Russell Park 
and Randy Park, negotiated a termination agreement with 
plaintiff, terminating Park's tenancy; (Tr. p. 17, line 17, 
through p. 18, line 3). 
6. On April 2nd, 1987, Hermes and Park's entered 
into a Lease Cancellation Agreement, canceling the Park's 
Lease; (Tr. p. 19; Exhibit 1). 
7. Park's sold its retail sporting good business 
located at the Hermes' Midvalley Shopping Center to Gart Bros 
4 
on or about April 2nd or 7th, 1987. 
8. The Lease Cancellation Agreement obligated 
Park's to commence on May 1, 1987, and continue for sixty (60) 
months, the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for 
each and every month; (Exhibit 1). 
9. The Lease Cancellation Agreement became 
effective as of the effective date upon which Hermes would 
have entered into a lease agreement with Gart Bros; (Exhibit 
1) 
10. The effective date of a lease between Hermes 
and Gart Bros, (the "Gart Lease") was the 7th day of April, 
1987; (Exhibit 7). 
11. The obligation of Park's to pay the $ 1,000.00 
per month was to continue until Gart Bros made to Hermes a 
percentage rent payment in any twelve (12) month period of a 
sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, under the 
Gart Lease; (Exhibit 1). 
12. Park's commenced the monthly payments pursuant 
to the Lease Cancellation Agreement and made eleven (11) 
payments thereunder amounting to the sum of $ 11,000.00. 
13. Park's did not pay the monthly payment due on 
April 1, 1988, and no other payment thereafter; (Tr. p.24, 
lines 3-10). 
14. As of the date of the trial Park's has not made 
twenty two (22) required monthly payments, amounting to the 
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sum of Twenty Two Thousand ($ 22,000.00) Dollars; (Tr. p. 33, 
lines 11-15). 
15. It was not intended by Hermes that Park's be 
excused from performance (i.e., the payment of $ 1,000.00 per 
month) on October 1, 1987, or January 1, 1988, or April 1, 
1988. 
16. It was not intended by Hermes that any 
subsequent (to April 2, 1987) agreement(s) between Hermes and 
Gart Bros (to which subsequent agreement(s) Park's was not a 
party) be or deemed to be a novation of the Lease Cancellation 
Agreement. 
17. It was not intended by any party that Park's 
would be a surety or a guarantor of the Gart Lease, or the 
obligations thereunder; (Tr. p. 37, lines 7-10). 
18. Plaintiff did not ask Park's to guarantee the 
Gart Bros lease; (Tr. p. 37, lines 4-6). 
19. Gart Bros did not request plaintiff to have 
Park's guarantee the gart Bros lease; (Tr. p. 37, lines 11-
13). 
20. Plaintiff did not demand that Park's pay for 
the Gart Bros lease rental payments; (Tr. p. 37, lines 19, 
21). 
21. It was not intended by any party that Gart Bros 
would assume the obligations of Park's under the Park's Lease, 
or under the Lease Cancellation Agreement. 
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22. There was no shortfall under the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement attributable to the Park's Lease, which 
was required to be paid by Gart Bros. 
23. During the first year, or the second year, or 
the year ending with December 1989, of the Gart Lease, Gart 
Bros did not achieve gross sales in sufficient amounts so as 
to obligate Gart Bros to pay to Hermes percentage rents in 
excess of $ 10,000.00. (Tr. p. 36, lines 13-22, Exhibit 2 and 
Exhibit 3). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
There is only one way that Park's can be excused 
from paying the monthly $ 1,000 to Hermes; the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement clearly, on its face, on the four 
corners of the document, states that when and if Gart Bros 
makes a percentage rent payment to Hermes, in any twelve month 
period, of a sum in excess of $10,000.00, then and in that 
event, Hermes will cancel the obligation of Parkfs to continue 
making the monthly $ 1,000 payments. 
Gart Bros did not pay any excess percentage rent 
payment during the pertinent period of this lawsuit. 
The defense of novation is not applicable to the 
facts and the law of this case. 
Also, the defense of breach of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing is not applicable to the facts 
and the law of this case; assuming arguendo that the defense 
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was applicable, defendant has waived the said defense at the 
time of trial and can not raise it on appeal for the first 
time. 
The judgment of the trial court must be affirmed in 
all of its particulars, and defendant should be awarded its 
cots and attorney's fees on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AMENDMENT 
TO THE GART BROS LEASE 
DID NOT CONSTITUTE NOVATION 
OF THE PARK'S OBLIGATION 
UNDER THE 
LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT 
Defendant contends that when plaintiff entered into 
a modification agreement with Gart Bros, on or about October 
1987, for leasing additional space to Gart Bros, that the 
modification agreement constituted novation, thus relieving 
defendant from the obligation to continue the monthly payments 
pursuant to the Lease Cancellation Agreement. 
In asserting the foregoing position defendant fails 
to point to any evidence in the record supporting such a 
baseless assertion. Defendant did not produce any evidence, 
by virtue of any testimony by an officer of the defendant 
corporation, nor did defendant offered any documentary 
evidence supporting its novation theory. 
Appellant appears to challenge the correctness of 
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the trial Courtfs finding that no novation occurred when the 
Gart Bros Amendment was entered into between plaintiff and 
Gart Bros. 
In order for defendant to mount a successful assault 
to the correctness of a trial court's finding the defendant, 
must first assemble all the evidence supporting the finding, 
and then demonstrate to the Appellate Court that the evidence 
is legally insufficient to support the finding even in viewing 
it in the light most favorable to the court below. In re 
Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 154 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Mitchell, 767 P.2d 817 (Utah 1989); Scharf v. BMG Corp. , 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). Defendant has failed to 
demonstrate, in its brief, that the trial court committed 
reversible error. 
Attempting to bootstrap its theories of "novation", 
or "breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing", defendant asserts in its brief, on pages 12-13 that 
"Park's was not aware of the terms of the Gart Lease at the 
time the Lease Cancellation Agreement was executed, but 
assumed that the Gart lease would be similar to the Park's 
lease . . . ". There is no evidence either in the form of 
testimony by an officer of defendant, or in the form of 
documentary evidence, which would allow defendant to make such 
assumptions. One of the persons who could have testified as 
to what the Park's assumptions were, was the president of the 
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defendant, Russell Park, who while present at the trial, did 
not take the witness stand to testify on behalf of the 
defendant. After all, he was a party to the preparation and 
execution of the Lease Cancellation Agreement, and privy to 
the conversations between plaintiff (J. Rees Jensen) and 
Russell and Randy Park. (Tr. p. 17, line 20 through p. 18, 
line 3) 
Plaintiff readily admits that the law in this 
jurisdiction recognizes the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the 
"Covenant"). Nevertheless, defendant has failed to prove by 
a preponderance of the evidence that the duty owed to the 
defendant was ever breached. Additionally, the allegation of 
the breach of the Covenant is an affirmative defense, which 
must be plead (Rule 8(c), Utah R. Civ. P.) at the time a 
responsive pleading, to the complaint, by defendant is filed. 
The foregoing affirmative was not plead in 
defendant's answer to plaintiff's complaint (Index pp. 00008-
00010). Furthermore, the said affirmative defense was not 
presented at the trial Court, at the time of the trial, either 
in the form of evidence presentation or argument. Defendant, 
having failed to properly assert and thus preserve the 
affirmative defense of the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, has waived (Rule 12(h), Utah R. Civ. P.)) the 
assertion of the same, and can not now for the first time 
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raise the issue on appeal. 
The standard of review for an appellate court is 
that of a "clearly erroneous" standard, which standard is 
applied in all cases, whether they arise in equity or at law. 
See Barker v. Francis, 741 P. 2d 548, 551 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). 
The action against Park's in the trial court was 
based upon the document known as the "Lease Cancellation 
Agreement", Exhibit 1. The terms of that document, relating 
to Park's obligations toward its former landlord are very 
similar and are akin to those of a promissory note. The 
document contains a contractual obligation of the defendant to 
make monthly payments of $ 1,000.00, in consideration of 
defendant's release from the lease obligations (the obligation 
to make monthly lease payments, and the pro-rata payment of 
real estate taxes, insurance, common area maintenance 
expenses, etc.) of the Park's Lease (Exhibit 6), and the 
forgiveness of a promissory note due to Hermes. 
Paragraph 2 of Exhibit 1 states the obligations of 
defendant in clear, concise and totally unambiguous language. 
Paragraph 3 of Exhibit 1 states certain conditions 
which would: a) either excuse defendant from paying the $ 
1,000.00 per month; and/or b) entitle defendant to a rebate. 
The evidence is clear and unequivocal; none of the 
conditions allowing defendant not to continue to pay, have 
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been met, nor can they be implied. 
Defendant by asserting the defense of novation seeks 
to exculpate itself from the obligation to make the monthly 
payments in accordance with the tenor of the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement. 
It is evident that defendant misconstrues and 
misapplies the principle of novation. Plaintiff's cause of 
action was not predicated upon the obligations of the Park's 
Lease; plaintiff's cause of action is based upon the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement and the pleadings reflect the same 
accordingly. There is no other subsequent "agreement" which 
modifies the Lease Cancellation Agreement. There is no 
evidence in the record and defendant points to none, 
evidencing the intent of plaintiff to change the terms of the 
Lease Cancellation Agreement, by entering into the Gart Bros 
Amendment. 
Defendant's theory of novation was similarly 
asserted and summarily rejected by the Utah Supreme Court in 
First American Commerce Company v. Washington Mutual Savings 
Bank, 743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987) wherein the Court stated: 
Lender insists that whether a novation 
occurred is a matter of law, not of fact. Lender 
asserts that the language of the loan documents 
clearly described a novation. We disagree with 
Lender on both assertions. Whether an agreement is 
a novation is a matter of intent. The essential 
element of a novation is the discharge of one of 
the parties to a contract and the acceptance of a 
new performer by the other party as a substitute 
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for the first original party. See Kennedy v. 
Griffith, 98 Utah 183, 187, 95 P.2d 752 (1939). A 
novation must be intended by the parties to the 
original contract. 
[T]he burden of proof as to a 
novation by the transaction in 
question rests upon the party who 
asserts it; ... an intention to 
effect a novation will not be 
presumed; ... in the absence of 
evidence indicating a contrary 
intention, it will be presumed, 
prima facie, that the new obligation 
was accepted merely as additional or 
c o l l a t e r a l s e c u r i t y , or 
conditionally, subject to the 
payment thereof; and that the 
intention to effect a novation must 
be clearly shown. 
As defendant has the burden of proof to prove the 
basic elements of novation, defendant has not produced any 
testimony nor other documentary evidence showing that the 
parties intended that defendant be discharged from its 
obligations, under the Lease Cancellation Agreement, to make 
the required monthly payments. 
Again in rejecting novation as a defense in Horman 
v. Gordon, 740 P. 2d 1346 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) the Utah Court 
of Appeals set forth the elements of novation as follows: 
"... For a novation to occur, there 
must be (1) an existing and valid 
contract, (2) an agreement to the new 
contract by all parties, (3) a new valid 
contract, and (4) an extinguishment of 
the old contract by the new one ... 
(citations omitted); _Id., p. 1352. 
In applying the foregoing elements of novation to 
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the facts of the instant case we see that the facts do not fit 
into the elements of the defense of novation: 
Element 1, "an existing and valid contract" is the 
Lease Cancellation Agreement. 
Element 2, "An agreement to the new contract by all 
parties" - there is no "new" contract which has been agreed to 
by all parties; the Gart Bros Amendment is a contract between 
plaintiff and Gart Bros only, and it was not required that 
defendant should evidence its assent. 
Element 3, "a new valid contract" - there is no "new 
valid" contract, between plaintiff and defendant; only an 
amendment to the Gart Bros Lease executed some six (6) months 
after the Lease Cancellation Agreement. 
Element 4, "an extinguishment of the old contract by 
the new one" - there is not a scintilla of evidence of intent 
(by plaintiff) of forgiveness, extinguishment, or exculpation, 
and defendant having the burden of proof can not point to the 
record for any such or similar evidence which might have been 
presented to the trial court. 
It is important to note that the Lease Cancellation 
Agreement between Hermes and Parks was not in any way, shape, 
or form, changed, nor was it altered, nor modified. Hermes at 
all times dealt with Parks strictly in accordance with the 
terms of the Lease Cancellation Agreement; additionally, Parks 
dealt with Hermes (until and including March 1, 1988) strictly 
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in accordance with the terms of the Lease Cancellation 
Agreement. 
Defendant in the instant case has failed in its 
burden of proof to show that novation occurred; no clear 
evidence, in either documentary or testimonial form, were 
presented to the Court evidencing the intent of the parties to 
have and to be bound by novation. 
The condition precedent, to Park's not having the 
obligation to make the monthly payment, (to-wit, payment by 
Gart Brothers of the percentage rents in excess of $ 10,000), 
had not occurred, as of the time of the trial. Plaintiff's 
evidence demonstrates that plaintiff calculated as the 
triggering mechanism for the payment of percentage rents by 
Gart Bros, to be the sum of $ 1,800,000.00 (Tr. p 55, lines 
11-20; p. 60, lines 2-4) sales' volume, regardless of the 
number of square footage occupied by and/or leased by Gart 
Bros (Tr. p. 62, lines 11-18). Mr. Holmberg testified as 
follows: 
Q. ... Now Mr. Holmberg, you made the calculations 
to make a determination to see whether or not 
percentage rent, excess percentage rent was paid in 
excess of $10,000 by Gart bros, in order to 
determine whether or not ... Parks had a continuing 
obligation to pay the thousand dollars. Is that 
correct ? 
A That is correct. 
Q. What sales did you take into account for 
the Gart Bros Lease ? 
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A. We used all of the sales reported to us by 
Gart Bros. 
Q. And you set it off against what standard ? 
A. We used the total sales reported to us, 
and the break point would be $ 1.8 million dollars 
as provided in the original documents. 
Q. That part of the agreement on the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement did not ever change with 
Parks brothers (sic), did it ? 
A. No. We calculated it in the same way before 
and after. It had not changed. 
Q. Okay. Based on those calculations, did 
..„ Hermes Associates receive $10,000 as percentage 
rents ? 
A. They did not. 
(Tr. p. 66, line 11 through p. 67, line 10) 
In cross-examination by defendant's counsel, Mr, 
Holmberg also testified as follows (Tr. p. 68, lines 9-14): 
Q. And did you do that [calculating the 
excess percentage rents] on the basis of square 
footage ? 
A. It's done on the basis of the total sales. 
Q. For both premises or just the original 
premises ? 
A. The total sales given to us by Gart Bros 
Upon further cross-examination Mr. Holmberg 
testified as follows (Tr. p. 68, line 23-25; p. 69, line 1-7): 
Q. The question is, did you calculate the 
sales on a square footage basis ? 
A. No. 
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Q. Did you include - when Gart Bros, took 
over and increased their spice [sic] (read space) 
by 54 percent, did that increase the amount of 
rental they had to pay before they got into 
percentage rental payment ? 
A. When they moved into the new space, their 
rent increased. However, the break point for 
calculating percentage rent did not change. 
In his entire testimony Mr. Holmberg testified that 
the break point for calculating the percentage rent due was 
based upon the figure of $ 1,800,000.00, and the total figure 
of total sales was taken into account, regardless whether the 
sales came from the space originally leased by Gart Bros, or 
as the space was enlarged by the amendment of the Gart Bros 
lease. (Tr. p. 69, line 8 through p. 70, line 15). See also 
the testimony of Mr. Holmberg relating to the method of 
calculation contained in the transcript page 75, line 15 
through page 76, line 3. 
Defendant additionally asserts as a secondary issue 
that Parks, in the absence of any written agreement, and by 
operation of law, became a surety or a guarantor of the Gart 
Lease obligations. 
In support of that contention defendant cites 
several cases, which upon close examination are clearly and 
factually distinguishable from the facts of the case at bar. 
For defendant to be able to prevail it would have to come 
within the ambit of the Horman v. Gordon case, supra. 
Defendant's version of the facts, as much as defendant wishes, 
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do not come within the purview of that case because for the 
principal as enunciated in Horman to apply, Gart Bros must 
have assumed the Lease Cancellation Agreement and not the 
obligations of the lease, which in any event were not assumed 
by Gart Bros. Hermes as the Landlord entered into an 
agreement, not an assignment, but a separate and distinct 
agreement to lease directly to Gart Bros the space previously 
occupied by Park's, at different rental rates and different 
percentage rates; Gart Bros did not assume Park's obligations 
as to rents and other required payments, and the parties did 
not intend that Gart Bros should assume primary liability for 
the rents with secondary liability by Park's. 
The obligations of Gart Bros under the Gart Lease 
are entirely different from the obligations of Park's under 
the Lease Cancellation Agreement (Tr. p. 60, lines 1-11). 
Parks could not, under any stretch of the imagination, become 
a surety for any shortfall under the Lease Cancellation 
Agreement, especially in view of the fact that Park's was the 
primary and only obligor under that agreement; additionally, 
there was not any shortfall which could possible accrue under 
the Lease Cancellation Agreement. 
Furthermore, that type of a defense, the "suretyship 
defense" does not apply to makers binding themselves as 
principals; see: First Nat. Bank v. Egbert, 663 P. 2d 85, 86-
87 (Utah 1983) accord: Utah Farm Production Credit Association 
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v. Watts, et al., 737 P.2d 154 (Utah Ct. App., 1987). 
One of the most important fact is, the fact that the 
contract, i.e., the Lease Cancellation Agreement, upon which 
plaintiff's cause of action is predicated, was not at any time 
changed, or altered; nor the interpretation by plaintiff was 
changed, in the application of defendant's liability 
thereunder. 
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the 
alleged "suretyship defense" is not applicable to the facts of 
this case, and defendant cannot prevail thereunder,, It is 
important to note that defendant, other than a proffer as to 
attorney's fees, in response to the trial court's inquiry, and 
the cross-examination of Plaintiff's witnesses, offered no 
witnesses of its own to establish its defenses to Plaintiff's 
claims before the trial court (Tr. p. 76, lines 15-16). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO 
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
In order for Plaintiff to receive the full benefit 
of its contract (the Lease Cancellation Agreement), the party 
not in default, the Plaintiff, is entitled to an award of 
interest to recompense it for money it could have earned if 
the breaching party (defendant) had kept its promise, on the 
date of breach. Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court allows 
the recovery of prejudgment interest where the "loss is fixed 
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as of a particular time and the amount of the loss can be 
calculated with mathematical accuracy". See Jorgensen v. John 
Clay & Co. , 660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983); accord: Bjork v. April 
Indus., 560 P.2d 315 (Utah 1977). 
The facts in the record clearly show that defendant 
breached the contract in April 1988; that the sum of $ 1,000 
was due on the first day of each month; that, defendant did 
not pay the monthly sum of $ 1,000 after March 1, 1988 (Tr. p. 
24, lines 5-10). The date of the loss suffered by the 
Plaintiff commenced on April 1, 1988, (finding number 15, 
Index p„ 158) and continued thereafter; and the amount of the 
loss, can in fact be calculated with mathematical accuracy, 
and, as of the date of the trial, is the sum of $ 22,000. The 
amount of the prejudgment interest can be easily calculated 
with mathematical accuracy. 
Applying Utah law to the facts of this case 
Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
DENIED AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES 
TO EITHER PARTY 
Utah follows the "American Rule" with regard to 
awards of attorney's fees. See Note, Attorney's Fees in Utah, 
1984 Utah L. Rev. 533, 534. The trial court did not abuse its 
discretion in not awarding attorney's fees to either party, 
and especially the defendant. The findings of the trial court 
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and its ruling found that defendant breached the Lease 
Cancellation Agreement. Certainly defendant is not entitled 
to attorney's fees when it (defendant) is the non-prevailing 
or not successful party. 
Defendant's attempt in seeking attorney's fees on 
the basis of a Rule 11 (Utah R. Civ. P. ) violation is in 
itself violative of Rule 11. Defendant does not point to any 
"... pleading, motion or other paper ..." which contain 
plaintiff's counsel's signature, which was interposed by 
plaintiff's counsel "... for any improper purpose, such as to 
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation." It is true that plaintiff requested 
a trial, so that it can have its day in court, and have a full 
hearing on all aspects of the case. 
Plaintiff's request for a trial can not be construed 
as having been made in bad faith especially in view of the 
lack of any evidence in the record. 
Furthermore, plaintiff's insistence that Rule 4-501, 
Statement of the Rule, (3) (g), Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, be observed by the trial court, (since 
defendant's motion for summary judgment was a dispositive 
motion), can not be interpreted, either as a violation of Rule 
11, (Utah R. Civ. P.), or as violative of § 78-27-56, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
Plaintiff's counsel's conduct in connection with 
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this matter is, and has been, beyond reproach and consistent 
with the ethical obligations which counsel has for his client; 
and, consistent with the statutory requirements of conduct; 
and, the Rules of Professional Conduct, in effect in the State 
of Utah, at the time of the trial. 
CONCLUSION 
In applying the "clearly erroneous standard" as 
provided by Rule 52(a), (Utah R. Civ. P.), in that 
"findings of fact ... shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 
given to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses " 
it is respectfully submitted that defendant has failed to 
marshal1 the evidence in order to reverse the judgment of the 
trial court. In reviewing the entire record the trial court 
did not commit reversible error. 
It is respectfully submitted that the trial court 
was correct, after the presentation of all of the evidence, to 
grant judgment in favor of plaintiff, Hermes Associates, and 
against the defendant Park's Sportsman, and that the amount of 
the judgment and the award of pre-judgment interest should be 
deemed correct. 
This Court should enter its order affirming the 
judgment of the trial court. 
Additionally, plaintiff should be awarded its costs 
and attorney's fees in connection with this appeal and such 
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other and further relief as this Court deems proper in the 
premises, 
DATED this %c JtL day of November, 1990. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-
Appellee 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served four (4) copies of 
the foregoing Respondents Brief to: 
Mr. Jackson Howard 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
120 East 300 North Street 
P. 0. Box 778 
Provo, Utah 84603 
by mailing the same, £irst class mail, postage prepaid, this 
of November, 199K 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
Final Judgment Appealed From 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 088-6074 
Judge: Wilkinson 
This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant 
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury; 
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees 
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being 
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant 
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell 
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson 
Howard, attorney at law; the Court having entered its 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
c 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED AND ADJUDGED 
that Plaintiff HERMES ASSOCIATES be awarded judgment against 
defendant PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah Corporation, in the amount 
of: 
$ 22,000.00 Principal balance 
$ 2,189.92 Accrued interest to date of judgment 
$ 83.25 Accrued costs to date of judgment 
$ 24,273.17 TOTAL JUDGMENT 
with interest on the total judgment at 12.0% per annum as 
provided by law from the date of this judgment until paid, 
plus after accruing costs; and 
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant is 
entitled to be notified of the volume of the annual gross 
sales generated by Gart Bros in the entire 20,820 square foot 
leased premises; plaintiff shall notify defendant as soon as 
plaintiff obtains the information relating to the volume of 
sales from Gart Bros. 
IT IS HEREBY, FURTHER, ORDERED that Defendant 
should not be required to make payments under the LEASE 
CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time as Plaintiff receives from 
Gart Bros a percentage rental payment in excess of Ten 
thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which sum is calculated 
against a gross sales base of One Million Eight Hundred 
Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of what minimum 
rent may apply to the Gart Bros Lease before percentage 
rentals become applicable thereunder. 
DATED this X ^ day of February, 1990, 
ZL&5-£^ ____ 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
^O) 
JACKSON (flCTWARD 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to Mr. 
Jackson Howard, attorney for defendant} 120 East 300 North 
Street, P. O. Box 778, Provo, Utah 84&03. postage prepaid, 
this yfoQ day of February, 1990. / }f) / ^ 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
466 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3303 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
Partnership, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. C-88-6074 
Judge: Wilkinson 
This matter came on regularly for trial, pursuant 
to notice, on the 11th day of January, 1990, before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, presiding without a jury; 
Plaintiff Hermes Associates was present by and through J. Rees 
Jensen, one of its General Partners, and plaintiff was being 
represented by Nick J. Colessides, attorney at law; defendant 
Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, was present by Russell 
W. Park, its president, and was being represented by Jackson 
Howard, attorney at law; the Court having adduced and 
received evidence on behalf of all parties, and the Court 
having heard argument on behalf of all parties, and the matter 
having been submitted to the Court, now upon motion of Nick J. 
Colessides, attorney for plaintiff, and good cause otherwise 
appearing therefor, the Court makes the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about May 20, 1982, Hermes as Landlord, 
and Park's as Tenant, entered into a lease agreement (the 
"Park's Lease") affecting certain retail commercial space 
located at Hermes1 shopping center, known as the Midvalley 
Family Center, at 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake County, 
Utah. 
2. Defendant Park's entered into possession of 
the leased premises and operated its retail sporting goods 
store until sometime in April 2nd, 1987. 
3. On April 2nd, 1987, Hermes and Park's entered 
into a LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT, canceling the Park's 
Lease. 
4. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT obligated 
Park's to commence on May 1, 1987, and continue for sixty (60) 
months, the payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for 
each and every month, subject to the percentage lease 
agreement and gross sales of $ 1,800,000.00 of Gart Bros. 
5. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT became 
effective as of the effective date upon which Hermes would 
enter (and in fact entered) into a lease agreement with Gart 
Bros. 
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6. As far as the sales volume is concerned the 
LEASE TERMINATION AGREEMENT applies to all of the space, 
20,820 square feet, leased to Gart Bros* 
7. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is the 
operative document wherein the respective rights and 
obligations of the plaintiff and defendant are clearly set 
forth. 
8. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT is a new 
agreement, valid and subsisting in and of itself, and not 
dependent upon any other document, except as it relates to 
paragraph 4 above. 
10. The LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT contained, 
inter alia, the following terms: 
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial 
and Industrial Lease Agreement of May 20, 1982, and all 
subsequent addendums or modifications are incorporated herein 
by reference. The said Lease Agreement and all addendums and 
modifications are hereby declared canceled effective as of the 
date on which a Lease Agreement between Hermes and Gart 
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., becomes effective. 
2. Consideration. In consideration of the 
cancellation of said Agreement, Park's does by this instant 
agree to pay Hermes the sum of One Thousand Dollars 
($1,000.00) per month for a term of sixty (60) months 
commencing on the 1st day of May, 1987, and continuing 
thereafter until sixty (60) installments have been paid or 
unless the said obligation is terminated or canceled by reason 
of the operation of Provision 3 following. 
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges 
that effective on the date that Hermes enters into a Lease 
Agreement with Gart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., for the 
lease rights of Park's to the premises located at 
approximately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
that this Lease Cancellation Agreement will become 
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contemporaneously effective. When and if Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc., make a percentage rent payment to Hermes 
in any twelve (12) month period of a sum in excess of Ten 
Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the subject demised 
premises, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of 
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no 
obligation to make further installment payments, provided that 
all installment payments previously due and payable to Hermes 
have been paid. It is further provided that at such time as 
Hermes receives the first said percentage rental payment in 
excess of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Gart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc., Hermes will refund to Park's up to 
Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance to the 
amount due and paid by Park's during the -twelve (12) months 
for which said percentage rent was paid to Hermes by Gart 
Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. 
11. The effective date of a lease between Hermes 
and Gart Bros, (the "Gart Lease") was the 7th day of April, 
1987. 
12. The terms of the Parks Sportsman's Lease, 
dated May 20, 1982, were not taken over by Gart Bros. 
13. The obligation of Park's to pay the $ 
1,000.00 per month was to continue until Gart Bros made to 
Hermes a percentage rent payment in any twelve (12) month 
period of a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) 
Dollars, under the Gart Lease. 
14. Park's commenced the monthly payments 
pursuant to the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT and made eleven 
(11) payments thereunder amounting to the sum of $ 11,000.00. 
15. Park's did not pay the monthly payment due on 
April 1, 1988, and made no other payments thereafter. 
16. As of the date of the trial Park's has not 
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made twenty two (22) required monthly payments, amounting to 
the sum of Twenty Two Thousand ($ 22,000.00) Dollars. 
17. It was not intended by Hermes that Park's be 
excused from performance (i.e., the payment of $ 1,000.00 per 
month) on April 2, or on October 1, 1987, or January 1, 1988, 
or April 1, 1988, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2 
and 3 of the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT. 
18. The Court finds that any subsequent (to April 
2, 1987) agreement(s) between Hermes and Gart Bros is not and 
it is not deemed to be a novation of the LEASE CANCELLATION 
AGREEMENT. 
19. The Court finds that Park's was not a surety 
nor a guarantor of the Gart Bros Lease, or any of the 
obligations thereunder. 
20. The Court finds that Gart Bros would not 
assume the obligations of Park's under the Park's Lease, nor 
under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT. 
22. During the first year, ending on December 31, 
1987, or the second year ending on December 31, 1988, or the 
third year ending on December 31, 1989, of the Gart Bros 
Lease, Gart Bros did not achieve gross sales in sufficient 
amounts so as to obligate Gart Bros to pay to Hermes 
percentage rents in excess of $ 10,000.00. 
23. Gart Bros did not make a percentage rent 
payment to Hermes Associates, in any twelve month period, of 
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a sum in excess of Ten Thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars for the 
total space 20,820 square feet) leased to Gart Bros. 
24. Plaintiff is entitled to receive and does 
receive from Gart Bros the information regarding Gart bros 
sales in the leased premises. It is Plaintiff's 
responsibility that Plaintiff should provide the information 
so received to the Defendant, as soon as possible after 
receiving it from Gart Bros. 
25. Plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment 
interest, at the rate of 10% per annum, amounting to the total 
sum of $ 1,990.93 as of the date of the trial, together with 
an accrued daily interest at the prejudgment rate of $ 6.03 
for each day from January 11th, 1990, until the date of the 
entry of the judgment, and thereafter at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
26. Neither party is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
27. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs in 
connection with this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now 
enters its 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment in the 
principal sum of $ 22,000.00; plus 
2. Pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per 
6 
G0J 
annum from the date that each monthly installment was due to 
the date of the entry of the judgment, which sum is $1,990.93 
as of January 11th, 1990, plus such additional sum equal to 
the rate of $ 6.03 per day until the date of the entry of the 
judgment, and thereafter interest at the rate of 12% per 
annum. 
3. Plaintiff is entitled to its costs of suit the 
same to be submitted by affidavit to the court by plaintiff's 
counsel. 
4. Neither party is entitled to an award of 
attorney's fees. 
5. Defendant is entitled to be notified of the 
volume of the annual gross sales generated by Gart Bros in the 
entire 20,820 square foot leased premises; plaintiff shall 
notify defendant as soon as plaintiff obtains the information 
relating to the volume of sales from Gart Bros. 
6. Defendant should not be required to make 
payments under the LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT at such time 
as Plaintiff receives from Gart Bros a percentage rental 
payment in excess of Ten thousand ($ 10,000.00) Dollars, which 
sum is calculated against a gross sales base of One Million 
Eight Hundred Thousand ($ 1,800,000.00) Dollars, regardless of 
what minimum rent may apply to the Gart Lease before 
percentage rentals become applicable thereunder. 
7 
DATED this }*- day of February, 1990. 
/ HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE: 
UZ^ JACKSON HOWARD^ 
KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD 
Attorneys for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law to Mr. Jackson Howard, attorney for 
defendant, 120 East 300 North Street, P. O. Box 778, Provo, 
Utah 84603, postage prepaid, this day of February, 
1990. 
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EXHIBIT "C" 
Lease of Cancellation Agreement 
LEASE CANCELLATION AGREEMENT 
THIS ACREEMENT etede and entered Into this 2nd day of April, 1987, by 
and between Harass Associates, a Utah partnerehip, hereinafter called "Hermes" 
and Park's Sportsman, a Utah corporation, hereinafter called "ParkV and 
WHEREAS, Hermes and Park's have entered into a Commercial and Industrial 
Least under an Agreement dated Hay 20, 1982, and 
WHEREAS, it la the intent and purpose of the parties to this Agreement 
to cancel aaid Lease Agreement conditioned upon certain terms and conditional 
herein stated, 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual covenants of aach of 
Che parties hereto 
IT IS ACREED: 
1. Lease Agreement Cancellation. The Commercial and Induatrial 
Lease Agreement of Kay 20, 1962, and all aubaequent addendume or modifications 
are Incorporated herein by reference. The aaid Leaae Agreement and all addtndums 
and modifications are hereby declared cancelled affective aa of the date on which 
a Least Agreement between Hermes and Cart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc. becomes 
effective. 
2. Consideration. In consideration of the cancellation of said 
Agreement. Park's does by this Instant agree to pay Hermes the eum of One Thousand 
Dollars (51.000.00) per month for a term of aixty (60) months commencing on the 
1st day ul Hay, 1987, and continuing thereofter until aixty (60) Installments 
have been paid or unleas the aaid obligation la terminated or cancelled by 
reason of the operation of Provlaion 3 following. 
3. Termination and Rebate. Hermes acknowledges that affective on 
the date that Hermes antera into a Leeee Agreement with Cart Brothera Sporting 
Coode, Inc. for the leaae rlghta of Park's to the premises located at approxi-
mately 5666 South Redwood Road, Salt Laka City, Utah that this Leaae Cancellation 
Agreement will become contemporaneously affective. When and if Cart Brothers 
Sporting Goods, Inc. make a percentage rent payment to Hermes in any twelve (12) 
month period of a eua in excess of Tan Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) for the 
aubject demised prealees, Hermes will cancel the payment requirements of 
Provision 2 above and thereafter Park's will have no obligation to make further 
installment payments, provided that all installment payments previously due end 
payable to Hermes have been paid. It la further provided that at auch time ss 
Hermes receives the first aaid percentage rental payment in excess of Ten 
Thoueand Dollars ($10,000.00) from Cart Brothers Sporting Goods, Inc., Hereel 
will refund to Park's up to Twelve Thousand Dollars ($12,000.00) in accordance 
to the amount due and paid by Park's during the twelve (12) months for which 
aaid percentage rent waa paid to Hermes by Cart Brothers Sporting Coods, Inc. 
4. Sstlsfsctlon of Promissory Note. Upon receipt by Hermes of the 
•urn of One Hundred Thirty Thousand Dollars ($130,000.00) from Cart Brothera 
Sporting Goods, Inc. (due and payable en or before Kay 1, 1967) aa reimburse-
ment for the total sum of One Hundred Forty-Eight Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($148,500.00) paid by Hermes to Park's for tenant leasehold Improvements in the 
aubject demised premises, Hermes aha11 return to Park'e that certain promiaaory 
note dated August 1, 1986 covering aaid aum marked MPaid in Full." 
PARK'S SPORTSMAN, a Utah corporation HERMES ASSOCIATES, a Utah partnership 
Aandy'R. Park / / / . tees Jen{X 
• Preeident "") 1 / Senior CetieAl Partner 
BY 
:'-"••< -*-<*/• f'/a^A 
ATTEST: Secretary 
